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Inference of person-to-person transmission of
COVID-19 reveals hidden super-spreading events
during the early outbreak phase
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Yuhai Bi 1,5,6✉
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first identified in late 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei
Province, China and spread globally in months, sparking worldwide concern. However, it is
unclear whether super-spreading events occurred during the early outbreak phase, as has
been observed for other emerging viruses. Here, we analyse 208 publicly available SARS-
CoV-2 genome sequences collected during the early outbreak phase. We combine phylo-
genetic analysis with Bayesian inference under an epidemiological model to trace person-to-
person transmission. The dispersion parameter of the offspring distribution in the inferred
transmission chain was estimated to be 0.23 (95% CI: 0.13–0.38), indicating there are
individuals who directly infected a disproportionately large number of people. Our results
showed that super-spreading events played an important role in the early stage of the
COVID-19 outbreak.
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Emerging and re-emerging pathogens have caused severaloutbreaks worldwide (such as influenza virus, Ebola virus,Zika virus, etc.), posing substantial threats to public health1.
Six types of coronaviruses have previously been reported to infect
humans, namely 229E, OC43, NL63, HKU1, severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), and Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)2. At the end of
2019, a novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19)3–5 caused by
SARS-CoV-2 (also known as 2019-nCoV or HCoV-196) was first
reported in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. COVID-19 subse-
quently spread throughout China and was detected abroad within
weeks. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared
COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
on 30 January 20207. Within a month, the global risk level of the
COVID-19 was raised from “high” to “very high“8. On 11 March
2020, COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the WHO9. Until 5
July 2020, more than 11 million confirmed COVID-19 cases have
been reported in 216 countries/territories/areas8. The global
spread of COVID-19 has thoroughly taxed the ability of many
medical systems to handle such a rapid increase in the number of
cases within such a short amount of time.
Super-spreading events (SSEs) are an important phenomenon in
the transmission of many diseases (such SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV,
Ebola virus, etc.), in which certain individuals infect many others,
compared to the basic reproduction number (R0, indicating the
average number of secondary cases caused by a single infected
individual in a susceptible population)10. Quick identification of
SSEs during the early phase of a disease outbreak could provide a
basis to tailor prevention and control policies to prevent spread on
a larger scale. Current approaches for the identification of SSEs are
mainly based on retrospective epidemiological studies. However,
epidemiological contract tracing mainly relies on patient recall,
which can result in false negatives. Therefore, other methods that
do not rely on epidemiological tracing data to identify SSEs are
needed. In 2005, Lloyd-Smith et al.11 proposed an “individual
reproductive number” (denoted as ν), representing the number of
secondary cases caused by a particular infected individual, which
was drawn from a continuous probability distribution with mean
R0. In this framework, specific SSEs are events from the right tail of
the distribution of ν and propensity for SSEs can be identified by
estimating the skewness of the distribution of ν.
Although some sporadic reports suggested that SSEs may have
occurred under certain circumstances12–14, it is still unknown
whether SSEs played a role during the early phase of the COVID-19
pandemic. In this study, we reconstruct a transmission tree of
COVID-19 based on genomic data and Bayesian inference under an
epidemiological model, and then infer parameters of the offspring
distribution in this transmission tree. We also test the impact of
uncertainty from phylogeny on our results. Our results demonstrate
that SSEs occurred during the early phases of the COVID-19
pandemic. These findings provide an important basis for guiding
the development of prevention and control policies, especially for
countries at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Results
Inference of transmission chains during the early phase of the
COVID-19 outbreak. We first constructed a dated phylogeny for
SARS-CoV-2 during the early phase of the outbreak in China
(Fig. 1a). Based on this dated phylogeny, the transmission tree
was reconstructed and the medoid transmission tree is shown in
Fig. 1b. There was considerable uncertainty in the inferred
transmission tree, which is not shown in the medoid tree but is
explored by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). To illus-
trate this uncertainty about who infected whom, we computed the
probability of direct transmission from any case to any other. In
total, we identified 18 pairs of patients with bidirectional prob-
ability for direct transmission (calculated by summing up the
directed transmission probability in both directions) >0.5, indi-
cating one of a pair of patients was directly infected by another
(Supplementary Data 1). The number of intermediates in the
transmission chains between each patient pair ranged between
0.002 (representing almost certain direct transmission) to 15.60,
with a mean of 8.60 (Supplementary Data 2), indicating many
patients have not been sampled in this transmission chain.
Validation of inferred transmission tree. We next verified
the stability of the transmission tree by cross-validating
the direct transmission events identified in our study. We
removed one patient (i.e., EPI_ISL_421252, EPI_ISL_421235, and
EPI_ISL_402127) from the top three direct transmission pairs
(i.e., EPI_ISL_408486 vs. EPI_ISL_421252, EPI_ISL_421236 vs.
EPI_ISL_421235, and EPI_ISL_412898 vs. EPI_ISL_402127) with
the highest bidirectional probability for direct transmission in
Supplementary Data 1, to generate a reduced dataset. We then
repeated the same analysis. If the remaining patient from a
directed transmission pair was inferred to be infected by an
unsampled patient in this reduced dataset, it demonstrated that
the inferred direct transmission event is reliable. We found that
most probabilities of direct transmission between these three
patients and others in this transmission tree were close to zero,
and the highest possibility of directed transmission for these three
individuals being infected by others are 0.0029, 0.0014, and 0.32,
respectively (Fig. 2a). This result indicates that they were likely
directly infected by an unsampled patient rather than those in this
reduced dataset, providing further evidence that the identification
of direct transmission events were likely to be reliable. We also
evaluated whether the uncertainty on the phylogeny affected the
result by independently performing analysis on ten randomly
selected trees from MCMC chains. We found that all runs had
unidirectional probability of direct transmission between each
pair >0.5, for these three patient pairs (Fig. 2b), indicating the
inference of direct transmission events were robust to the
uncertainty of phylogeny. In summary, the transmission chains
and directed transmission events inferred in our study were
robust.
Identification of SSEs. The offspring distribution (number of
secondary infections caused by each case) was also inferred in this
study. The offspring distribution was assumed to follow a nega-
tive binomial distribution and we computed its mean and var-
iance at each MCMC step. The mean of the offspring distribution
is the basic reproduction number R0 and was equal to 1.23 (95%
confidence interval (CI): 1.09–1.39), indicating that on average an
infected individual could cause 1.23 infections in a susceptible
population. The variance for the offspring distribution was esti-
mated as 8.31 (95% CI: 5.06–13.39). As shown in Fig. 3a, the
variance was significantly larger than the mean, which is known
as overdispersion. In addition, the dispersion parameter of the
offspring distribution was estimated as 0.23 (95% CI: 0.13–0.39),
further demonstrating the overdispersion in offspring distribu-
tion. We also tested how the uncertainty of phylogeny affected the
estimation of the offspring distribution parameters. The disper-
sion parameter of the offspring distribution based on ten ran-
domly selected trees was slightly higher than for the maximum
clade credibility (MCC) tree (Fig. 3b). As the MCC tree is more
accurate than to trees sampled in MCMC chains, this result
suggested that the uncertainty of the phylogeny would cause an
overestimation of the dispersion parameter of the offspring dis-
tribution, which meant that it would underestimate the impor-
tance of SSEs. In summary, the number of offspring inferred from
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the transmission tree was highly skewed, indicating SSEs did exist
during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Discussion
Infectious diseases, such as COVID-19 and influenza, can spread
globally at a very rapid rate due to globalization and increased
international travel and trade. In addition, differences in the
preparedness and vulnerability of different countries against
COVID-19 will lead to different impacts on countries with
imported cases15. SSEs, in which a high number of contacts are
infected, have been identified for other diseases (such as SARS16,
MERS17, etc.). The occurrence of SSEs contributes to the speed
and severity of an outbreak and also affects the development of
disease management and prevention policies by health autho-
rities. Human transmission has been documented for COVID-
1918 and asymptomatic patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection can
also transmit the virus19, leading to an urgent need to monitor
SSEs, which could greatly aggravate the spread of COVID-19.
Person-to-person transmission patterns during the early stages
of the COVID-19 pandemic have been inferred in this study. Due
to the low sampling frequency, only a small number of direct
transmission events (18 pairs of patients), with bidirectional
probability for direct transmission > 0.5, were detected. Further-
more, the result from computational cross-validation on direct
transmission events with high quality also indicated that the



































Fig. 1 The phylogeny and transmission tree of SARS-CoV-2 during the early stage of COVID-19 outbreak. a Maximum clade credibility phylogeny
estimated from genomic sequences of SARS-CoV-2 collected during the early stage of COVID-19 outbreak. Posterior probabilities >0.6 are shown with a
purple circle. The size of the circle is proportional to the posterior probability. b Medoid transmission tree for the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Patients are marked with different colors of branch on the phylogenetic tree. Red asterisks represent a transmission event.
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addition, this result was robust to the uncertainty on phylogeny
resulting from the low genetic diversity of viral genomes collected
during the early stages of COVID-19 pandemic.
We also inferred the offspring distribution and, in particular,
the dispersion parameter of this distribution. A recent study
demonstrated that the dispersion parameter can be most accu-
rately estimated when using phylogenetic data20. In this study, we
used a phylogeny of SARS-CoV-2 to infer the dispersion para-
meter. The dispersion parameter was estimated as 0.23 (95% CI:



























































Fig. 2 Validation of direct transmission events with high quality. a Boxplot of the bidirectional probability for direct transmission between three patients
(ID:1, 2, and 3 represent EPI_ISL_408486, EPI_ISL_421236, and EPI_ISL_412898, respectively) and others (do not include the person who directly transmit
to each other). Upper bound, center, and lower bound of box represent the 75th percentile, the 50th percentile (median), and the 25th percentile,
respectively. Whiskers represent 1.5× interquartile range and points are outliers. b Dotplot of the bidirectional probability for direct transmission of three
paired patients with high quality (ID:1, 2, and 3 represent EPI_ISL_408486 vs. EPI_ISL_421252, EPI_ISL_421236 vs. EPI_ISL_421235, and EPI_ISL_412898 vs.





































Fig. 3 Heterogeneity of transmission during the early stage of COVID-19 outbreak. a The mean and variance of the offspring distribution along MCMC
iterations. b The 95% CI distribution of dispersion parameter using MCC tree and ten randomly selected trees from the MCMC chains.
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distribution of offspring was highly skewed or overdispersed due
to the existence of SSEs11. This estimation was only based on the
MCC tree, which represented the tree with the maximum sum of
posterior clade probabilities in MCMC chains. However, we
found that the uncertainty of the phylogeny would lead to an
overestimation of the dispersion parameter (Fig. 3b). As smaller
the dispersion parameter, the greater the heterogeneity of its
distribution, overestimating the dispersion parameter would lead
to underestimation of the degree of SSEs. Thus, it is reasonable to
estimate the dispersion parameter by using MCC tree. The value
of the dispersion parameter we estimated for COVID-19 was
similar to previous estimates for Ebola virus disease (0.18, with
95% CI: 0.10–0.26)21 and SARS (0.16, with 90% CI: 0.11–0.64)11,
indicating that SSEs also occurred in COVID-19 during the first
2 months. As the Chinese government has implemented a series
of measures to avoid the flow and gathering of people after 23
January 202022, it is less likely that SSEs would have happened
after this date. Therefore, we speculated that the SSEs are likely to
have occurred within the first month of the COVID-19 outbreak.
Our findings suggested SSEs occurred early on, although this
phenomenon has not been reported in previous studies23,24,
which may be explained as follows. First, SSEs usually occur in
densely populated and relatively closed spaces, such as hospitals
and communities (like the Prince of Wales Hospital or the Amoy
Gardens housing complex during the SARS epidemic)10. Due to
the higher binding affinity to the receptor of human angiotensin I
converting enzyme 2 (at least tenfold)25 and compatible aerosol
and surface stability26, SARS-CoV-2 is likely to be transmitted
more easily than SARS-CoV in humans. Combined with the
finding that asymptomatic COVID-19 patients could also trans-
mit virus19, it was more likely that spaces where super-spreading
might occur could be more diverse, which could not be easily
traced. Furthermore, the identification of SSEs was traditionally
based on epidemiological tracing data, which depends on patient
recall. However, it was difficult to trace person-to-person trans-
mission using only epidemiological data, except for familial
clusters. Second, the difference in the incubation period of dif-
ferent patients will also make it difficult to detect SSEs through
epidemiological investigation during the early stages of the
COVID-19 pandemic. The mean incubation period of COVID-19
was estimated to be 5.2 days and 95% of the distribution of
incubation period was 12.5 days (95% CI 9.2–18)23, indicating
that the incubation period varied greatly among patients. Com-
pared with patients with a shorter incubation period, patients
with a longer incubation period are more likely to infect more
people during their incubation period. In particular, if the
patients with a longer incubation period did not show obvious
symptoms at the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, they
will not be traced. In summary, the identification of SSEs during
the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak would be difficult
based on epidemiological data, whereas our genomic approach
circumvents this issue. In addition, several factors (including
environment, human behaviors, mutations in human genome,
etc.) can contribute to heterogeneities in the transmission of
infectious diseases10. Future work should seek to identify these
factors for COVID-19, so that we can tailor the disease man-
agement and prevention policies accordingly.
Methods
As a wider spatial distribution of cases makes inference increasingly difficult as the
pandemic expands, we focused on the study on early phase of COVID-19 outbreak.
To strike a balance between the small amount of variation between viral genomes
during the early stage of outbreak and sufficient variation to support this study, we
defined the scope of the study to focus on the first 2 months of the outbreak. We
only analyzed samples collected within the first 2 months (starting with the earliest
sampling time until the next 60 days) in China. All SARS-CoV-2 genomes with
high coverage from China were downloaded from GISAID. Only complete
genomic sequences with exact collection date (accurate to days) were used in this
study. Genomic sequences that are considered to contain many sequencing errors
(https://virological.org/t/temporal-signal-and-the-evolutionary-rate-of-2019-n-
cov-using-47-genomes-collected-by-feb-01-2020/379) were discarded from our
analysis. In total, 208 SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences were used in this study. The
list of genomic sequences used in this study and their clinical information are
provided in Supplementary Data 3 and 4, respectively.
After sequence alignment was performed with Mafft v7.31027, we trimmed the
uncertain regions in 3′ and 5′ terminals (1–55 and 29,804–29,903 according to the 1-
indexed coordinate of MN908947.3) and also masked 30 sites (Supplementary
Table S1) that are highly homoplastic and have no phylogenetic signal as previous
noted (https://virological.org/t/issues-with-sars-cov-2-sequencing-data/473), result-
ing in total genomic length of 29,718 nt. As recombination could impact the evo-
lutionary signal, we searched for recombination events in these SARS-CoV-2
genomes using RDP428. No evidence for recombination was found in our dataset.
We used jModelTest v2.1.629 to find the best substitution model according to the
Bayesian Information Criterion. The best substitution model for our dataset was
HKY+ I. We then used the Bayesian MCMC approach implemented in BEAST
v1.10.430 to derive a dated phylogeny for SARS-CoV-2. Three replicate runs for each
100 million MCMC steps, sampling parameters, and trees every 10,000 steps. The
estimation of the most appropriate combination of molecular clock and coalescent
models for Bayesian phylogenetic analysis was determined using both path-sampling
and stepping-stone models31. The best-fitting combination of prior molecular clock
and coalescent model were an uncorrelated relaxed clock with log-normally dis-
tributed variation in rates among branches and Bayesian skyline tree prior (Sup-
plementary Table S2). Tracer 1.7.132 was then used to check the convergence of
MCMC chain (effective sample size > 200) and to compute marginal posterior dis-
tributions of parameters, after discarding 10% of the MCMC chain as burn-in. The
posterior distributions of phylogenies in the posterior tree space are shown in
Supplementary Fig. 1. TreeAnnotator was used to summarize a MCC tree (Fig. 1a)
from the posterior distribution of trees (after discarding 10% of the MCMC chain as
burn-in). We also tested whether there was enough temporal molecular signal in this
dataset. IQ-TREE 2.0.333 was used to reconstruct the phylogeny under best sub-
stitution model (HKY+ I) with 1000 ultrafast bootstrap replicates34. The relation-
ship between root-to-tip divergence (from the phylogeny above) and sampling date
for genomic data used in this study is also shown in Supplementary Fig. 2A using
TempEst v1.5.335. We also compared the prior and posterior distribution of para-
meters to determine the significance of the temporal signal in these genomic data. If
there was a strong temporal signal in the dataset, the posterior distribution of
parameters would be significantly shifted away from their prior distribution. As
shown in Supplementary Fig. 2B, the prior and posterior distributions of tree heights
were significantly different. These results confirm that there is sufficient temporal
signal in our genomic data for reconstruct of a dated phylogeny.
As viral genomes were incompletely sampled and the pandemic is currently
ongoing, TransPhylo v1.3.2036 was used to infer the transmission tree using the
dated phylogeny generated above as input. The generation time (i.e., the time gap
from infection to onward transmission, denoted as G) of COVID-19 was pre-
viously estimated as 7.5 ± 3.4 days23 and we used these values to compute the shape
and scale parameter of a gamma distribution of G using the R package epitrix37.
The distribution of sampling time (i.e., the time gap from infection to detection and
sampling) was set equal to the distribution of generation time. We performed the
TransPhylo analysis with 500,000 iterations simultaneously estimating the trans-
mission tree, the proportion of sampling, the within-host coalescent time Neg, and
the two parameters of the negative binomial offspring distribution (which repre-
sents the number of secondary cases caused by each infection). All results were
generated after discarding 20% of the MCMC chains as burn-in. The MCMC
mixing and convergence was assessed based on the effective sample size of each
parameter (>200) and by visual examination of the MCMC traces (Supplementary
Fig. 3 and Supplementary Data 5).
As the SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences collected in the early stages of the
pandemic were highly similar, it was difficult to obtain an exact phylogeny. Thus,
we further tested whether the uncertainty in phylogeny affected the result. Ten
dated phylogenetic trees were randomly selected from the MCMC chains (Sup-
plementary Fig. 4) for TransPhylo analysis. The parameter setting was the same as
above. These independent runs were performed with 500,000 iterations, with
20–30% of the MCMC chains discarded as burn-in (Supplementary Data 5). In
addition, we performed cross-validation on the direct transmission pair with high
probability. We randomly removed one patient in the top three pairs of patients
with the highest bidirectional probability of direct transmission and then recon-
structed the dated phylogeny to repeat the TransPhylo analysis. If all of the
bidirectional probabilities of direct transmission between the retained patient from
these three pairs and any other patient in this study are lower than 0.5, then the
directed transmission events identified in our study are more likely to be reliable.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All data used in this manuscript are publicly available from GISAID. Accession numbers
of genome sequences used in this study are listed in Supplementary Data 3.
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